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 Abstract— Substantial research has been devoted to the 
development of algorithms that automate buried threat detection 
(BTD) with ground penetrating radar (GPR)  data, resulting in a 
large number of proposed algorithms.  One popular algorithm 
GPR-based BTD, originally applied by Torrione et al., 2012,  is the 
Histogram of Oriented Gradients (HOG) feature.  In a recent 
large-scale comparison among five veteran institutions, a modified 
version of HOG referred to here as “gprHOG”, performed poorly 
compared to other modern algorithms.  In this paper, we provide 
experimental evidence demonstrating that the modifications to 
HOG that comprise gprHOG result in a substantially better-
performing algorithm.  The results here, in conjunction with the 
large-scale algorithm comparison, suggest that HOG is not 
competitive with modern GPR-based BTD algorithms. Given 
HOG’s popularity, these results raise some questions about many 
existing studies, and suggest gprHOG (and especially HOG) 
should be employed with caution in future studies.  
 
Index Terms—Histogram of Oriented Gradients, HOG, ground 
penetrating radar, buried threat detection 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In this work we focus on the problem of developing 
algorithms for automatic buried threat detection (BTD) using 2-
dimensional measurements from a ground penetrating radar 
(GPR), called B-scans [1]–[3].  Figure 1 presents examples of 
B-scans collected over the locations of buried threats.  This 
topic has received substantial attention in recent years, resulting 
in a large number of proposed algorithms [4]–[7].   
Most recently proposed algorithms have adopted some variant 
of a general processing pipeline comprised of two steps: feature 
extraction and classification.  In feature extraction, a function 
is designed that extracts a numeric vector representing the GPR 
imagery.  Ideally, the extracted vector will succinctly encode 
any visual content that is relevant to decision-making, while 
suppressing irrelevant content such as noise.  The classification 
step is comprised of a function that maps the feature vectors to 
a decision statistic, or confidence, indicating the relative 
likelihood that the vector corresponds to a buried threat. 
In 2014, Torrione et al. [5] proposed to use the Histogram of 
Oriented Gradients (HOG) feature from the computer vision 
community for GPR-based BTD, and it has subsequently 
become widely used [8]–[19] (88 total Google Scholar 
citations, at time of writing).  In particular, HOG is frequently 
used as a baseline approach to suggest the superiority of new 
algorithms [8], [9], [13]–[18], [20]–[22]. Surprisingly however, 
a modified version of HOG, called “gprHOG”, recently 
performed poorly in a large-scale algorithm comparison, 
conducted with algorithms submitted by several institutions 
with substantial experience in GPR-based BTD[7]. The results 
in [7] however can justifiably be viewed with skepticism 
because it provides relatively little detail about gprHOG, and 
no experimental evidence justifying its superiority over HOG.   
In this work we use a large collection of real-world GPR data, 
and two popular experimental designs, to show that gprHOG 
substantially and consistently outperforms HOG. In 
conjunction with the findings in [7], this strongly suggests that 
HOG is not competitive with other modern algorithms. Given 
the widespread popularity of HOG, this is an important finding 
and it suggests that gprHOG (and especially HOG) should be 
employed with caution in future studies.    
Despite the relatively poor performance of gprHOG in [7], we 
show that each of its modifications to HOG yield (sometimes 
large) performance improvements. These modifications are 
largely generic, and could be used to improve other GPR-based 
algorithms, or to guidance for new algorithm designs.  
 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section 
II presents the GPR system and data; Section III presents 
background information; Section IV presents the experimental 
design; Section V presents the results of each modification to 
HOG, and the final gprHOG algorithm; and Section VI presents 
conclusions. 
II. GPR SYSTEM AND DATASET DESCRIPTION 
All data in this work were collected using a downward 
looking GPR (similar to the one in [1], [6], [7]).  The GPR is 
comprised of an array of equally spaced antennas (i.e., cross-
track) that are pointed perpendicularly downward so that data 
can be collected at subsurface locations directly below each 
individual antenna.  Each antenna emits an ultra-wideband 
electromagnetic signal, consisting of a differentiated Gaussian 
pulse, and then measures the energy reflected back from the 
subsurface.  Each antenna collects a time-series of reflection 
energies, known as an A-scan [1].  As the vehicle travels down 
a lane, A-scans are collected at regular spatial intervals (i.e., 
downtrack) from each antenna.  The measured A-scans result in 
a 3-D cube of GPR data with two spatial dimensions and one 
temporal dimension, as shown in Figure 2(a). 
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Figure 1: Examples of GPR data collected over several different buried 
threats.  In each panel, referred to as a B-scan, the vertical axis corresponds 
to time (or sometimes depth), and the horizontal axis corresponds to space. 
  
  
The GPR system was used to collect data at two U.S. test sites, 
comprising a total surface area of 120,817.4 m2.  The data was 
collected over 13 distinct lanes especially prepared for this 
purpose.  A total of 90 runs were made over all of the lanes.  In 
each lane, targets were buried at known locations, to facilitate 
evaluation of the developed BTD systems.  A total of 664 
unique targets were buried for this work and are of varied types 
and metal content and were buried at a range of depths of 
interest.  The total dataset consists of 4,552 threat encounters. 
III. BACKGROUND METHODS 
In this section, we provide background information regarding 
the methods used in this work.  This includes a description of 
the framework we follow for designing and evaluating BTDs 
and a description of the HOG feature. 
A. The detection pipeline 
The cube of collected GPR data is processed in a pipeline that 
is typically used for BTDs in this literature [1], [5]–[7], [23] and 
is illustrated in Figure 2.  The processing pipeline is divided into 
two stages: prescreening and discrimination.  The prescreener 
flags spatial locations in the cube that it considers anomalous or 
otherwise suspicious.  The discriminator processes the data at 
those locations, referred to as alarm locations, and outputs a 
decision statistic for each, indicating the relative likelihood of 
buried threat at that location.  The focus of this work is on 
discrimination algorithms (i.e., feature extraction plus 
classification). 
B. Data extraction at prescreener alarm locations 
The discriminator is used to further inspect the data at 
locations flagged by the prescreener.  A large portion of the data 
at those locations corresponds to background data; the 
reflections that would commonly be associated with threat 
presence are typically within a relatively small and localized 
spatio-temporal extent [24].  The discriminator is typically 
provided with data from a subset of the larger cube that 
encompasses this extent for each alarm.  This subset cube is 
extracted around spatio-temporal coordinates of interest in the 
volume, referred to as keypoints [1].  Thus, at each threat and 
non-threat spatial location flagged by the prescreener, temporal 
coordinates where buried threat signal exists at a particular 
spatial location, need to be identified.  The Maximum 
Smoothed Energy Keypoint (MSEK) method is used here for 
this purpose, as described in [25].  This method operates in 
several steps.  The initial ground reflection is first estimated, 
aligned, and then removed (see Section IV.A).  Subsequently, 
the B-scan is background normalized, its central A-scan 
smoothed and local maxima are chosen as candidate locations 
for sub-image extraction. 
C. The HOG Feature 
The HOG feature was designed to succinctly encode shape 
information of natural imagery [26].  In the context of GPR 
data, HOG is used to encode the hyperbolic shape that buried 
threat signals typically exhibit [5].  The HOG feature is 
computed in three steps, which are described in detail in Figure 
3, and are computed on the image patches extracted at keypoints 
in the GPR volume.  The output from this step is a vector of 
numbers, which are provided to the discriminator in place of the 
raw pixel intensities of the image patch. 
D. Supervised classification 
To perform discrimination between the threat and non-threat 
classes, we follow the common approach of applying 
supervised classifiers [1], [7], [23].  Supervised classifiers 
perform discrimination by first learning the difference between 
the two classes from labeled examples provided to the classifier 
in a process referred to as training.  Once trained, the classifier 
can be applied to new data to determine whether a threat is 
buried at that new location.  To train the detector, data is used 
that is extracted at prescreener alarm locations for threats and 
non-threats. 
E. Evaluating algorithm performance 
In this work, we trained and tested each discriminator using 
cross-validation.  This is a common approach for evaluating the 
performance of machine learning algorithms, and has been 
employed previously for BTD with GPR data [1], [5], [6], [16].  
In this procedure, the dataset is divided into 𝑁 non-overlapping 
groups, referred to as folds.  The discriminator is trained on 𝑁 −
1 folds and the resulting model is used to predict threat presence 
on the outstanding fold.  This process is repeated 𝑁 times in 
cyclical fashion where each time, a model is trained to obtain 
predictions on one of the folds that have not yet been used for 
testing.  In this way, predictions are made on the entire dataset 
without ever using a discriminator for testing that was also 
trained on that same fold.  
To compare the detection performance of each trained 
classifier, receiver operating characteristic (ROC) curves are 
commonly used in the BTD algorithm research literature [6], 
[27].  ROC curves plot the relationship between the false 
detection rate (x-axis) and true detection rate (y-axis) of a 
classifier, as its sensitivity is varied.  We adopt the common 
practice in the BTD literature of scaling the x-axis of the ROC 
curve to report the false alarm rate in terms of false alarms per 
square meter [6], [23].  In this work, the exact FAR range is 
redacted.  The ROC is constructed using prescreener alarms 
 
Figure 2: Illustration of a typical processing pipeline in the GPR BTD 
literature.  The goal is to process the entire cube of data and provide a 
probability of buried threat presence at each location in the cube.  (a) The 
GPR volume is processed by a computationally inexpensive algorithm, 
referred to as a prescreener, to identify suspicious locations, which are 
indicated by red crosses.  (b) At each suspicious location, a feature vector 
is computed using surrounding GPR data.  The feature vector is provided 
to a discrimination algorithm to compute the likelihood of threat presence 
at this location.  The output is a scalar decision statistic, or “confidence”. 
  
 where an alarm is declared a true threat if it lies within 0.25m 
of a threat ground truth location.  The discriminator decision 
statistic is used for each alarm.   
IV. EXPERIMENTAL DETAILS 
In this section, we provide details regarding specific design 
choices made for the experiments in this work.  The design 
choices are kept as similar as possible to the original application 
of HOG by Torrione et al., 2014, [5] to facilitate comparison. 
A. Prescreening and data processing 
The dataset for algorithm development is obtained by using 
the combination prescreeners described in [7]: F2, an energy-
based anomaly prescreener and CCY, a shape-based 
prescreener.  Alarms are obtained by setting a sensitivity 
threshold for the prescreener such that 96.05% of threat 
locations are identified corresponding to a total 4,372 threat 
locations along with 6,070 non-threat locations [7]. 
At each prescreener alarm location, several common 
preprocessing steps are applied to the cube of data before 
feature computation [1], [5], [6].  The initial cube of data 
consists of 448 time indexes.  First, the time index at which the 
ground reflection first appears (i.e., the boundary of the air-
ground interface) is estimated.  Each A-scan is then shifted up 
or down to align the data so that the ground appears at the same 
time index of 100.  The response in air and slightly below the 
aligned ground is subsequently removed and the data from 
times 109 to 448 are kept for further processing.  The resulting 
cube of 330 time samples is subsequently depth normalized. 
B. HOG feature parameters 
The parameters used for the HOG feature are slightly 
modified to better capture the average shape of threats in our 
dataset and to avoid computing the feature on much background 
data.  An image size of 18 × 20 pixels (time × space 
coordinates) is used and following [5], we use a 3 × 4 cell 
configuration.  Therefore, we use cells of size 6 × 5 pixels.  
Both the block size and the number of angle bins are kept the 
same: blocks are composed of 3 × 3 cells and the histogram is 
constructed with 𝜃 = 9 angle bins. 
C. Classification 
For classification, we use the same classifier as [5], namely 
the Random Forest classifier (MATLAB implementation using 
100 trees, 2 variable splits at nodes, and leaf-size of 1) [28].  
For each alarm, two HOG feature vectors are computed using 
the same parameters: one on an image extracted with A-scans 
along the cross-track (cross-track B-scan) and the other on an 
image with A-scans along the down-track direction (down-track 
B-scan).  The two feature vectors are concatenated to form a 
single vector, which is provided to the classifier.  
Because multiple sub-images in a B-scan can be relevant for 
detection and this number may differ between threats and non-
threats, the training dataset construction is an additional design 
parameter.  In [5], for threats, MSEK is used to identify the top 
4 locations with highest signal energy.  For non-threats, sub-
images are selected at regular, small intervals down the 
temporal axis of the B-scan.  When applying the BTD to data at 
a new spatial location, the trained classifier is applied to every 
4th temporal location at that spatial location, resulting in 82 
total possible testing locations.  The final confidence for scoring 
is computed as the sum of the confidences at the 𝐿 temporal 
locations with highest confidence, where 𝐿 = 3 in [5].  
D. Cross-validation (OBCV and LBCV) 
We use two types of cross-validation to account for the 
possible change in performance for different such procedures 
[29].  The first type is lane-based cross-validation (LBCV) 
where each fold corresponds to the data of a particular lane, 
resulting in 13 folds.  The second type is referred to as object-
based cross-validation, OBCV, (or stratified cross-validation) 
[1], [5], [6].  In this scenario, individual objects on the lane are 
assigned to folds, 10 in this case, independent of the lane they 
come from.  We additionally note that the HOG feature was 
developed for OBCV and therefore we want to measure 
whether performance is improved in that scenario as well. 
V. THE  GPRHOG ALGORITHM 
In this section, we present experiments that were used to 
investigate the effect the adaptations to the computation of the 
HOG feature we suggest have on discrimination performance.  
The adaptations we propose here are aimed at tailoring the 
 
Figure 3: Illustration of the HOG feature computation.  (a) The image patch is divided into a grid of sub-windows, referred to as cells, of dimension 𝒄𝒙 ×
𝒄𝒚 pixels, which are demarcated by red boxes.  The green box demarcates a block of 𝒃𝒙 × 𝒃𝒚 cells, which will be used in a later step.  (b) In each cell, the 
direction of the gradient at each pixel is computed.  A histogram of the directions of the pixels in the cell is computed with 𝜽 angle bins whose centers are 
evenly distributed between 𝟎 and 𝟏𝟖𝟎 degrees.  Each pixel is assigned to the angle bin to which its gradient direction is most similar.  The contribution 
of each pixel to the histogram is weighted by the gradient magnitude of that pixel.  An example of the computation of the histogram is shown for the sixth 
block, 𝒙𝒃𝟔, with 𝜽 = 𝟒.  (c) In this fashion, a histogram is computed for each cell and the histogram values of each cell are organized as a vector of 
numbers.  (d) The histograms are normalized using the block of neighboring cells to the current cell (including the current cell, as shown in the green box 
in (a)).  In this example, the histogram entries of 𝒙𝒃𝟔are divided by the 𝒍𝟐 norm of the entries of the histograms of the cells in the normalization block. 
  
 computation of HOG to GPR data (hence the name gprHOG) 
and are therefore expected to be beneficial across datasets.  We 
note that we have found these changes to be beneficial across 
several datasets and radars, but those results are not shown in 
this paper.  The experimental design described in Section IV are 
used to evaluate the performance of the proposed adaptations.  
A. Removal of block normalization  
The first adaptation regards the last step in the HOG 
computation process, namely, the block normalization.  This 
step is used in natural imagery to mitigate local contrast 
changes [26].  In the context of GPR, regions of high contrast 
are typically indicative of the presence of a subsurface anomaly 
(e.g., a buried threat).  Therefore, in this experiment, we remove 
the normalization step altogether.  The performance difference 
shown in Figure 4 (blue lines versus red lines) suggests that 
block normalization does not translate well to GPR data.  
 
B. Greater temporal keypoint averaging  
Recent work in [1] demonstrated that, when using shorter 
patches such as those employed by HOG (in contrast to e.g., 
EHD, SED, and LG feature [7]), it is generally best to average 
classifier predictions over a relatively larger number of 
temporal keypoints, 𝐿, along the central A-scan of a prescreener 
alarm.  This can be done to account for the possibly diffuse 
reflections over time, or multiple reflections buried threats often 
exhibit.   
In [1], the authors found that the best-performing value of 𝐿 
will vary across classifiers and datasets, but that performance 
varies little when 𝐿 ∈ [8,12].  Furthermore, performance within 
this range is always superior to the value of 𝐿 = 3 typically used 
with HOG.  In our experiments 𝐿 = 12  similarly yielded the 
best performance, as shown in Figure 4, but similar to [1], 
performance varied little with respect to 𝐿.  
C. Multiple B-scan feature averaging 
The third adaptation we propose is motivated by the 
observation that GPR data is relatively noisy compared to 
natural imagery.  Furthermore, the patterns we wish to identify 
in GPR-based BTD are relatively simple.  In such a context, an 
approach to mitigate noise is to average raw GPR data, or 
feature vectors, where possible.   
To compute the gprHOG feature, for a given direction (e.g., 
down-track), 3 additional down-track HOG features should be 
extracted on B-scans on either side of the prescreener alarm 
location (i.e., 7 HOG feature vectors in total).  A final down-
track HOG feature is computed by averaging these 7 vectors 
together.  The same procedure is performed for the cross-track 
direction.  In Figure 5, we present the results of this feature 
averaging approach, where the averaged HOG features are 
referred to as “denoised HOG.”  We experimented with 
averaging different numbers of B-scan features, and while they 
all improved performance, we found that 3 on either side 
performed best.  That averaging the feature vector improves 
performance is consistent with our recent work in [30], as well.   
 
D. gprHOG versus the original HOG  
Figure 6 presents a comparison of gprHOG and HOG (from 
Torrione et. al., 2014).  gprHOG substantially outperforms 
HOG over the entire ROC curve, for both experimental designs.  
In conjunction with the results in [7], where gprHOG performed 
relatively poorly compared to other modern algorithms, this 
strongly suggests that HOG is not competitive with other 
modern algorithms.  Given the widespread popularity of HOG, 
this is an important finding and suggests gprHOG (and 
especially HOG) should be used with caution.  We note that this 
study uses the same FAR ranges as [7], permitting direct 
comparison.   
VI. CONCLUSIONS AND IMPLICATIONS FOR HOG  
In this work, we considered the design of the popular HOG 
algorithm, as applied for GPR-based BTD by Torrione et. al [5]. 
We presented three modifications to HOG with the goal of 
better adapting it to GPR data.  Using a large dataset of real-
world GPR data, and two popular experimental designs, each 
modification was shown to improve performance.  The 
combination of these modifications, which we name gprHOG, 
outperforms the original HOG algorithm by a substantial 
margin.   
In conjunction with the results in [7], where gprHOG 
performed relatively poorly compared to other modern 
algorithms, this work strongly suggests that HOG is not 
competitive with other modern algorithms.  Given the 
widespread popularity of HOG, this is an important finding and 
suggests gprHOG (and especially HOG) should be used with 
caution in future studies.  Despite the relatively poor 
performance of gprHOG in [7], each individual modification 
within gprHOG is beneficial and largely generic, and therefore 
could be used to improve other GPR-based algorithms. 
 
Figure 4: The results of removing the block normalization step from the 
HOG feature,  increasing 𝑳 = 𝟑 to 𝑳 = 𝟏𝟐 similar to the conclusions from 
[1].  Result when evaluating the algorithm using (a) LBCV, (b) OBCV. 
  
 
Figure 5: Classification performance using the proposed denoising post-
processing step to the HOG feature.  Performance is evaluated using (a) 
LBCV, (b) OBCV. 
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Figure 6: Performance comparison between the initial HOG algorithm as 
described in Torrione et al., 2014 [5], gprHOG before and after tuning to 
the current dataset.  Performance is evaluated using (a) LBCV, (b) 
OBCV. 
  
